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CommunicationsHe took the wheel in a lashing roaring hurricane
And by what compass did he steer the course of the ship?
“Mypolicy is to have no policy,” he said in the earlymonths,
And three years later, “I have been controlled by events.”
“The People, Yes” Carl Sandburg
1. Introduction
In soliciting and selecting articles for this issue, we explicitly
wanted tomake sure thatwe represented the diversity ofwork
on planning and forecasting for large scale emergencies.
Disasters threaten all societies, everywhere in the world, but@njit.edu (S.R. Hiltz),
.vlaanderen.be
Inc.Open access under CC BY-NCthere is great variety in the way disaster management is
organized in different countries and even in different parts
of the same nation. Therefore, first, we wanted to make sure
that we have work that spans many different nations, and
indeed, we do, including Australia, Cyprus, Finland, Israel, Italy,
Malaysia, Romania, Spain, and the U.K., as well as the United
States. Secondly, we wanted to include the perspectives of
actual managers and practitioners, not just academics; two of
the papers selected are case studies by practitioners. Finally,we
wanted to include a variety of methods of study, and we have
papers based on case studies, unstructured interviews, coding
and statistical analysis of the results of a literature review,
surveys, and modeling.2. Case studies and related aspect papers
We are fortunate to have two very detailed case studies of
a large scale disaster in this special issue. Good case studies in-ND license.
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detailed case studies, we can learn about why failures and
errors occurred and what we can do to learn how to
improve all the phases of emergency management. The
theories of behavior for High Reliability Organizations and
the associated suggested “Science of Muddling Through”
point out strongly that those organizations must seek out
and expose any errors or harm that their organization does
so they can be corrected to better handle future emergen-
cies [1,2]. Unfortunately, this clear need to understand and
improve past performance in disaster planning and re-
sponse is not the case in most organizations. There is more
concern with public images, liability concerns, and political
repercussions. It is from the disasters that represented clear
failures in response that we have the opportunity to gain
insights that are needed to improve planning and response
[3].
Both of these case studies use the framework developed
by Turner [4]. Turner examined 84 official accidents and
associated reports over an eleven year period, published by
the British Government. He points out that in the intervals
of time between major similar disasters there is decay of
awareness and preparation, which is the major cause of
poor response to the next similar disaster incident. His
framework of the six stages of a disaster is very insightful
for guiding an analysis of the fundamental causes of poor
planning and foresight as well as the resulting poor
response (Table 1). As one reads these two cases, it is easy
to see how four recent major disaster response failures can
easily be fitted into the same framework: Katrina, the BP
Gulf Oil Spill, the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, and Hurri-
cane Sandy.
The Turner framework serves to uncover many of the
fundamental causes of the “failures of foresight” [5, p. 121]
that rarely become explicit in the typical “official report”
in the past or the present. We offer two summary tables
from the Turner paper that give a quick overview of that
framework, which is relevant to a good number of the other
papers in this collection, consistent with individual points
made in Table 2.Table 1
Turner stage model ([4], p. 381).
Stages The sequence of events associated with a failure of foresight
I Nationally normal starting point: initial culturally accepted
beliefs about the world and its hazards; associated
precautionary norms set out in laws, codes of practice, mores,
and folkways.
II Incubation period: the accumulation of an unnoticed set of
events which are at odds with the accepted beliefs about
hazards and the norms for their avoidance.
III Precipitating event: forces itself to the attention and transforms
general perceptions of stage II.
IV Onset: the immediate consequences of the collapse of cultural
precautions become apparent
V Rescue and salvage — first stage adjustment: post collapse
situation is recognized in ad hoc adjustments which permit the
work of rescue and salvage to be started.
VI Full cultural readjustment: an inquiry or assessment is carried
out, and beliefs and precautionary norms are adjusted to fit the
newly gained understanding of the world.One significant feature missing in the incubation period is
the conflict in goals and objectives. For a lot of recent
disasters one can identify the reduction of maintenance
costs, reducing infrastructure investment, and similar deci-
sions which can save immediate costs or raise profits, but
which reduce safety and increase risk. An example today is
typified by the BP Gulf Disaster [6]. This is an extrapolation of
the last item in the features of the incubation period in state
II.
The specifics of the two large scale disaster case studies
follow.
2.1. The failure of foresight in crisis management: a secondary
analysis of the Mari disaster (Panos Constantinides)
This is an analysis of a large explosion in a naval base in
Cyprus in July 2011 which killed 13 people and injured 62
others while completely destroying the major power plant
on the island. This paper examines how foresight into crisis
management decisions was compromised by red tape,
bureaucracy, poor communication and poor information
flows.
The emphasis in this analysis focuses on the problem of
communications among many diverse organizations in
governmental, public, and private roles. It shows a lack of
the exchange of important information, the lack of exchang-
ing and collaboration on plans and the limited approach of
not considering how one disaster can trigger others. Clearly,
there was no perception of disasters in one area triggering
disasters in other areas.
2.2. Plans never go according to plan: an empirical analysis of
challenges to plans during the 2009 Victoria bushﬁres (Richard
Oloruntoba)
This paper deals with the challenges to the Victoria State
disaster plan before and during the “Black Saturday” Australian
bushfires of February, 2009 where 173 persons perished. This
involved over 300 separate large fires and 1000 smaller fires
burning simultaneouslywith over 50% of theMurrindindi Shire
council area of Victoria being under fire. Given that fires are a
very serious and frequent problem in Australia and that the
area had a long history of droughts and fires, there seemed
to be a buildup of over-confidence in the existing plans and
preparedness.
It turned out that in the incubation stage there seemed to
be quite a few unnoticed failings in regulatory land-use
planning and building codes and laws. Emergency planning
did not keep up with the spread of numerous small towns in
a very fire-prone area, and maintenance, such as controlled
burning of forests for fuel load reduction, was not sufficient.
An increasing number of “strangers” moved into the area
who did not understand the possibility of a compound threat
made up of a long term drought (13 years) and a severe
heatwave period. No public body seemed to want to
contemplate the possibility of the extreme disaster that did
occur (a fire storm). Just about all the phenomena that Turner
developed in his framework influenced the occurrence of this
disaster.
In this disaster, the increasingly narrow focus of risk
management over time was what Turner referred to as the
Table 2
Common features observed in the development of major disasters and their relation to various stages of development ([4], p. 391).
Stage Feature (comments)
I. Initial beliefs and norms Failure to comply with existing regulations (violation of existing precautions).
II. Incubation period 1. Rigidities of belief and perception (events unnoticed or misunderstood because of erroneous assumptions)
2. Decoy phenomena (breaking up a complex problem into simple problems for separate treatment; that often
does not solve the original problem)
3. Information difficulties and noise (difficulties of handling information in complex situations)
4. The involvement of strangers (people without the same cultural experiences and objectives)
5. Failure to comply with discredited or out of date regulations (violations unnoticed because of cultural lag in formal precautions)
6. Minimizing of emergent danger (a reluctance to fear the worst outcome)
III. Precipitating event The occurrence of the actual disaster; the immediate response and the near term recovery. Today some disasters can
last for weeks, months, or even years, for example, pandemics. (This entry added to the table by authors of this paper)IV. Onset
V. Rescue and salvage
VI. Full cultural readjustment Definition of new well-structured problems and appropriate precautions in inquiries following the disaster.
(The establishment of a new level of precautions and expectations.)
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but ill-structured problem by substituting a less severe
well-defined and well-structured problem. This major fallacy
of planning in ignoring the real ill-structured problems by
substituting simpler well structured problems plagues many
types of planning today.
Planning and foresight should include the development of
three related understandings:
1. What has occurred since the last similar disaster that
might increase the expected risks and damage?
2. What can be done to make the response more effective?
3. What can be done to mitigate the potential recovery
problems?
Today, dynamic modeling often focuses on the response
phase and ignores the other periods of the process. These
models are used to train people to understand the assumed
threat and the response to it more than they are used in
making longer term investment decisions. To do that, we
really need models for all three periods that can integrate,
so the results of the incubation period can feed into the
response stage model, and both those models can feed into
the recovery stage model. An excellent candidate for this is
the recent Sandy disaster in the Northeast United States. A
prior occurrence of this type and location of disaster was the
1938 hurricane [7]. Many of the current local political
leadership claim Sandy was a complete surprise and unique
and some of the same problems that occurred in the past are
reoccurring in the current recovery period.
The following three papers highlight and discuss specific
problems that Turner included in Table 2. Most of these focus
on communication problems within and between organiza-
tions involved with emergency response.
2.3. Communication issues: a study in Finland (Kimmo Laakso
and Jari Palomaki)
This article includes an observation by the chair of the
Accident Investigation Board in Finland that “The situation in a
disaster is never so bad that poor communication and flow of
information cannot change things for the worse.” The first
part of this paper describes an accident in which incorrect
information about the nature of a chemical spill made thesituation much worse. It goes on to argue for the need for the
development of a common ontology in order to support
cross-sector communication among the different organizations
that will be involved in any large scale emergency. An initial
framework for developing such an ontology is presented,
emphasizing communication and interactions among actors
who belong to “different organizations representing differ-
ent organizational cultures, including different usage of
language.”
The paper thenmoves on to the first of a planned series of
empirical studies that focuses on such actors in Finland.
Conceived of as a multi-round Delphi, 35 different types of
organizations were invited to participate, representing
government authorities, private companies, and volunteer
organizations. They nominated 48 experts experienced in
emergency management to take part. Open ended questions
in a face to face interview were used in this first round, to
gather participants' accounts of challenges or problems they
have noticed in inter-organizational communication during
disaster response. Among the top problem domains identi-
fied were:
1. Situation awareness and the flow of information;
2. Inadequacy of current “drills” for actually being prepared
to function smoothly; and
3. Communication at the time of impact and immediately after.
In regard to issues 1 and 3 above, one of the most
significant factors is the lack of inter-operability among the
data systems used by different authorities and organizations.
Often this is deliberate, because the organization does not
want to share its data with others. In terms of issue 2, the
drills are described as generally being related to “routine” or
small scale accidents, rather than major disasters that would
require units from several different organizations to respond
and cooperate. They also felt that the participants for the
required yearly drills did not take them very seriously (as
many people do not take fire drills seriously) and that they
did not result in improved planning.
As with other studies in this issue based on a single
company, or even a single organization, the issue of
generalizability to other contexts is raised. The Finnish
authors plan to have a more structured set of subsequent
rounds administered through an Internet based Delphi
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replicated in several different national contexts.
There are countries that only recently emerged from very
centralized and rigid bureaucracies where everything was
determined from the top down with little input from the
population. Often these countries had only very limited disaster
response activities and little effective local planning feeding
into the centralized processes. The next paper is an attempt to
improve on the lack of adequate two-way communication in
emergency management.
2.4. A case study of changing emergencymanagement in Romania
(Marian Zulean and Gabriela Prelipcean)
The majority of published studies about emergency man-
agement are about the U.S. and other “first world” western
nations. However, the majority of nations in the world do not
fit into this category. Many, like Romania, are in a situation
where they have been undergoing a transformation in the
organization of emergency preparedness and response, from
an authoritarian structure under the direction of the military
and focusedmainly onwar-related disasters, to a decentralized
and civilian-controlled structure focused both on natural or
man-made disasters. A two part study reviews the historical
evolution of planning and managing disasters in Romania and
presents an empirical study of the views of current Romanian
managers about the most important risks the nation faces and
the current degree of planning and preparation to deal with
them.
Earthquakes (most notably one in 1977) and floods have
been the most damaging natural disasters in the past, with
extreme temperatures also causing many fatalities recently.
The first part of this article gives the history of the
organizational transformation and the problems encoun-
tered. Romania's recent membership in NATO and the EU
accelerated efforts to organize and reorganize emergency
preparedness and response, based on county units, under
the direction of the Ministry of the Interior. However, a
World Bank report concluded that there is still a need to
improve Romania's environmental, social, and economic
vulnerability to natural disasters and mining accidents,
especially in terms of implementing risk reductionmeasures
and reducing the fragmentation of the current organization,
which is based on separate lead institutions for each type of
event.
The second part of the paper is forward looking, based on
a three round online Delphi study that included participa-
tion by 30 of the 42 emergency management counties in
Romania. One interesting result was that the managers saw
large scale forest fires as the second ranking threat after
earthquakes, and this type of disaster has not been given
national priority. They also noted a very low level of
preparation for possible nuclear disasters (e.g., related to
power plants), and for earthquakes, even though the latter
has been a focus of national attention. The managers
perceive a strong need to improve the preparation of the
population for dealingwith risks, including the possible local
effects of terrorist actions (a disaster type currently relegat-
ed almost entirely to the domestic intelligence organiza-
tion), and also for improved risk mitigation; in other words,
a shift in emphasis from “response” to “planning.” Moreoverthey suggested that an “integratedmanagement” approach – to
include a functional Emergency Management Information
System (EMIS) – will overcome the institutional gap created
by decentralization and will improve the communication for
risk governance.
2.5. Planning in the emergency operations center (EOC) (Michael
Ryan)
Michael Ryan's practitioner's paper is a significant insight
into the ongoing consequences and paradoxes of the situation
that EOCs in the U.S. face. Very few papers really disclose what
goes wrong in this sort of Center. The organizations involved in
responding to disasters are very reluctant to talk or provide
information on what has gone wrong and what sort of errors
are made. This is contrary to the philosophy of creating High
ReliabilityOrganizations [1]. A prior detailed case study ofwhat
can gowrong in an EOCwhich had passed all the standards and
approvals necessary [3] shows how the problems discussed
here can ultimately defeat the effective operation of the center
in a real disaster.
The local EOC involves many organizations and profes-
sionals that are not activated as a team until a disaster is
imminent. This fundamental problem has been mentioned in
other sources, but rarely has anyone carefully itemized the
specific problems that can occur. While this is focused on
county level EOCs in the United States, one can infer that
similar problems occur elsewhere in the world. Clearly, the
success of the EOC operation is very much dependent upon
what many other organizations do for preparedness and
collaboration before the disaster looms.
Another factor relevant to the actual response to a disaster
is that much of the information coming into the center is based
upon verbal inputs and even much of the outgoing communi-
cation is transmitted verbally. When there are many verbal
sources dealing with overlapping information and no compa-
rable dynamic record that can be automatically checked for
confusions, there are problems even in everyday emergency
systems such as the allocation of ambulances [8].
We start with hundreds to thousands of managers and
professionals who are interdisciplinary in nature, some of
whom will have had no actual experience in a real disaster,
attempting to work together in small teams on solving complex
problems by recognizing the current reality and potential
conflicts for the timely allocation of resources. Every organiza-
tion has their own plans to be carried out and to be dynamically
modified to meet new challenges. We have to realize that often
the vast majority of communications will occur verbally over
phones and direct verbal interactions. Many of the participants
from the organizations, and public citizens, who have key
information to contribute, will not have access to or member-
ship in the underlying Incident Command System (ICS).
Another paper in this special issue (Laakso, Palomaki) illustrates
how this restriction to verbal transfers of information can lead
to critical errors or confusion.
Other noticeable challenges are the lack of:
• Training, especially for new people who have not gone
through prior disasters
• Feedback for the reality of current situations (situation
awareness)
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• Individuals able to work in different roles to substitute for
others on a 24/7 schedule
• Systems that are easy to learn and use effectively
• Virtual EOC allowing fully distributed teams, and
• Consistency and realism between those making the plans
and those executing them.
2.6. The Conjoint Community Resiliency Assessment Measure as
a Baseline for Proﬁling and Predicting Community Resilience for
Emergencies by Odeya Cohen, Dmitry Leykin, Mooli Lahad,
Avishay Goldberg, and Limor Aharonson-Daniel
Resiliency refers to a community’s ability to function and
recover when faced with crises, and should be an important
element affecting emergency response plans. One compo-
nent is the quality of infrastructure and services in the
community, and the other component is social. Measuring
and validating a perceived resiliency was done by a survey
process. The sample used was 886 adults in nine small to
medium sized towns in Israel. The study is based on a
questionnaire, which can be obtained from the authors upon
request for use by other researchers.
Analysis of the pattern of responses shows that CCRAM
consists of six factors: Leadership, Collective efficacy (defined
as “social cohesion among neighbors, combined with their
willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good”),
Preparedness, Place attachment, Social trust and Social
relationships. The use of the CCRAM tool is suggested for
taking periodic measures to see if actions need to be taken to
improve the readings on the dimensions, and as an aid for
planning for emergencies.
3. Five papers on modeling
Modeling disasters is an important component of both
planning and training in emergency management. We have
two papers which are concerned with using groups to create
and use models. They both use two approaches to the
building of dynamic scenarios. One uses the very popular
System Dynamics Modeling but with an emphasis on using a
group of professionals to collectively determine the interac-
tion variables to be used. The other one uses the Cross Impact
approach applied to the hypothetical explosion of a dirty
bomb in an urban area. It places an emphasis on how to get
consistent quantitative estimates from a small group of
estimators. The protocols developed may be used with larger
groups to estimate the subjective probabilities of the
interacting events.
While the vast majority of modeling activities emphasize
the response phase of emergency management, we have one
that emphasizes the recovery stage. It is a model for
determining where are the most desirable localities to rebuild
living areas after the L'Aquila Earthquake in Italy. This also
represents the sort of approach that should be taken to landuse
planning in any area likely to be subjected to earthquakes. We
lack models that integrate the incubation period of Turner [4]
into the response and recovery period. The lack of consider-
ation of land use risks is one of the most significant oversights.
While all the model efforts take very different approaches,
it is of interest to compare them. They all involve use ofprofessionals to create or interpret the model through a
group process and to create a tool that can give insights to
others who wish to understand what can happen and what
can be done to encourage good outcomes rather than bad
ones.
Tabletop exercises are very common as an approach to
modeling a given disaster involvement and to train people to
recognize the complexities of the potential disaster they are
addressing. Many tabletops focus on making the local
leadership aware of things they normally don't think about
with respect to potential disaster situations. There is rarely
any systematic attempt to capture and utilize the results of
such “enlightenment” exercises. The third paper on modeling
focuses on actually assessing the resulting group process to
determine the confidence of the participants who are for the
most part individuals that would have to assume active roles
in the given disaster process.
Decision trees are a support tool that uses a tree-like
model of decisions and their possible consequences. Deci-
sion trees are commonly used in decision analysis, to help
identify a strategy most likely to reach a goal. The fifth
modeling paper is based on this technique and it illustrates
the use of a simple, integrative but sharp decision-making
tool for further testing towards enhancing city resilience and
sustainability.
3.1. Learning before the storm: modeling multiple stakeholder
activities in support of crisis management, a practical case
(Josune Hernantes, Elliot Rich, Ana Lauge, Leire Labaka, and Jose
Mari Sarriegi)
This paper aims at modeling multiple stakeholder activities
when dealing with critical infrastructures in a crisis situation.
The authors develop three formal simulation models to
analyze crises from three different temporal perspectives:
crisis peak, whole lifecycle of a single crisis and multiple
crises. The information gathering process to develop simu-
lation models consisted of a series of facilitated workshops
among a diverse group of experts representing stakeholders
in a specific critical infrastructure such as a distributed
power grid. In the study, the infrastructure system can be
examined by employing a Group Modeling Building (GMB)
process and a resulting System Dynamics (SD) simulation of
their inputs. The reason diverse stakeholders are included is
that the results of different types of outages and response
actions can be used to see the impacts on different aspects of
a crisis area. The authors developed a set of four different
simulated outages to show different emergency situations
that stimulate the thinking of emergencymanagers. They are
able through the SD models to look at short and long term
consequences such as coordination aspects in response, cost
of recovery, and the effectiveness of preventive measures
and lessons learned.
The stimulus of themodels for a diverse group of emergency
managers is to be able to define clusters of mitigation policies,
actions that increase resiliency, and improved preparation for
future crisis situations. This generates insights in maintenance,
infrastructure adequacy and redundancy, internal training,
external training, legal and regulatory clarity, lessons learned,
information exchange, and communication via public and social
media.
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through cross-impact (Victor A. Bañuls, Murray Turoff, and Starr
Roxanne Hiltz)
This paper is a follow on to an earlier paper in TFSC
dealing with the theory behind the modeling method used in
this paper [9]. It deals with creating a model of this type for a
potential terrorist action. Harold Linstone was the editor for
this paper and his description of the paper follows within the
quotes.
“Scenarios provide a basis for group decision making in
emergency management. The paper introduces the use of
Cross-Impact Analysis combined with Interpretive Structural
Modeling (CIA-ISM). The first activity is the creation of an
event set where each event is proposed by experts and
evaluated by them for its significance in their collaborative
building of the model. Group processes such as Delphi or
brainstorming may be helpful at this stage. The second
activity is estimation of the cross-impact probability rela-
tionships; that is, does occurrence of event A increase or
decrease the likelihood of event B or have no effect during
the next 24 hours?To illustrate the application of CIA-ISM, a
potential terrorist attack with a dirty bomb is described
which involves the release of radioactive Cesium contami-
nating 16 square blocks in an urban area and affecting 30,000
to 40,000 people. In building the model there are assumed
initial conditions, such as bomb recognition by trained
firemen, and dynamic events such as a medical responder
demanding a radiation detector within the first hour of
the explosion. Outcome events include, for example, “city
isolation” until contamination detection for all citizens is
conducted, and “short term success” with 80% of those
contaminated being detected and decontaminated within
24 hours. Digraphs play a prominent role in this analysis in
terms of illustrating graphically the relative impact of each
event upon the other events. It should be noted that CIA-ISM
makes it easy to combine the subjective estimations of
influences of any type of physical events with the subjective
estimations of influences of behavioral events.”
Besides developing a dynamic event model of the results
of a dirty bomb explosion in an urban area, this paper
discusses the process three people (the authors) had to go
through to develop a consistent group estimation of the cross
impact factors for four source events, ten dynamic events,
and four outcome events.
3.3. Improving public health emergency preparedness through
enhanced decision-making environments: a simulated and
survey based evaluation (Ozgur Araz and Megan Jehn)
High-level plans cannot be adapted to and implemented in
local environments unless the emergency managers are educat-
ed about the plans and their action options for specific types of
scenarios, and have some opportunity during training exercises
to practice in a realistic manner. A key issue is whether a specific
type of training for plan implementation and perhaps plan
improvement is actually effective. This paper describes a project
that can assist others in providing a methodology for such
assessment of training.
The specific scope of the training described in this paper
is limited; it deals with decisions school districts canmake totry to mitigate the health and social impacts of a pandemic,
specifically an H1N1 pandemic. The Arizona project devel-
oped a “table top” exercise that is simulation-driven and
uses media to create a realistic, immersive decision-making
environment. Not just emergency managers participated,
but also other stakeholders, such as members of parent–
teacher associations. When schools are closed to try to
decrease contagion, parents need to find alternate ways to
have their children educated, cared for, and fed, if they have
jobs outside of the home, and this can cause serious
disruption to the community. As the authors describe it,
the simulation model allowed the participants to “discuss
and evaluate decision processes during the exercise while
viewing the real-time simulated impacts (e.g., percentage of
the population infected, duration of outbreak, costs of school
closures, etc.) of their decisions.”
However, the main contribution of the paper is not the
description of the training itself, but the fact that a series of
three surveys was built into the training sessions to assess
changes in knowledge and confidence of the decision
makers as a result of the training program. It should be
noted that there were statistically significant improvements
on most measures, but the confidence levels of the
participants were high even before the training, in this
case. Though the specific study is limited to one type of crisis
in one state in the U.S., the paper has implications for
community level interventions and political level decision
making in crisis events of different types and in different
locations.
3.4. Spatial connectivity as a recovery process indicator: the
L'Aquila Earthquake (Diana Maria Contreras Mojica, Thomas
Blaschke, Stefan Kienberger, and Peter Zeil)
This paper develops measures of spatial connectivity to
integrate variables such as distance, travel time, and quality
of public transportation for determining the satisfaction
of citizens to move to new settlements in an earthquake
recovery process. They determined for this Italian city that a
meaningful correlation between the new settlements and
the inner city strongly influences the preference to either
stay or to move. Even though the earthquake occurred about
four years ago, L'Aquila is still in an early recovery phase of
restoration. It was observed, based upon the results, that it is
preferable to plan recovery by specific activities to be carried
out spatially (by location) rather than by periods of time for
specific infrastructures independent of location. It is also
observed that problems with urban services, facilities, and
transport usually come from the lack of community involve-
ment in the recovery plan and its implementation. The
recovery process, especially in Europe, is often focused on
restoring quickly major historical sites, to the detriment of
optimized public services and infrastructure.
3.5. Dynamic decision trees for building resilience into future
eco-cities (Ioan M. Ciumasu)
This paper illustrates the application of dynamic decision
trees for developing city sustainability. The paper proposes a
reformulation, in terms of urban riskmanagement, of an earlier
developed ontological scenario generation method [10]. The
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prioritization of pressures (seen as sources of systemic risk)
followed by responses to questions in an informed order of
priorities. The author illustrates themethodological proposal in
the concrete context of the city of Iasi (Romania). The case
presents and discusses four ontological scenarios along a
dynamic decision tree: Receding City, Wanting City, Promising
City and Inspiring City. This reflects a set of three top priorities
formulated as questions to be answered by the community:
(1) implementation of a business-friendly and efficient
governance system, (2) development of a resource manage-
ment system, and (3) carrying out a human capital
accelerator strategy. The scenarios are discussed in terms
of systemic risks at the end of post-communist transition
and beginning of the socio-economic convergence with
Western Europe.
The focus of the article is planning towards sustainable
cities. Although at first glance the subject is rather exotic to
this journal, it deserves a place in this special issue in the
sense that emergency/disaster preparedness is an essential
part of sustainability. What is of particularly great value is the
paper's attempt to bridge the world of the ‘business as usual –
low tempo mode’ on the one hand, and the ‘emergency
preparedness – up-tempo mode’, on the other hand. The
research findings have the potential of constituting a basis for
further elaboration of a ‘design for the exceptional’ approach.
The interesting thing here is that this is done by drawing on
insights frommoremainstreamdisciplines such as governance,
business development, and resourcemanagement. In thatway,
an intertwining of insights can take place with the result that
best practices from emergency and crisis management studies
become more mainstream.4. Speciﬁc comprehensive studies
4.1. A Delphi-based risk analysis — identifying and assessing
future challenges for supply chain security in a multi-stakeholder
environment (Christoph Ulrich Markmann, Igna-Lena Darkow,
Heiko von der Gracht)
We have seen a great many disruptions of supply chains
due to ignoring potential natural disasters in areas where
supply sources have been built, or the lack of accountability
of local governments to take actions to mitigate such risks.
This paper presents the results of collaborative problem
solving via a Delphi exercise to expose and examine such
risks for supply chains. Too many companies do not really
involve themselves in assessing the location of the actual
sources of their supplies. Nor do they carefully expose and
assess the risks that those sources may face. In today's
complex international production society the problems of
insuring the success of a given supply chain or even being
aware of the risks is a “wicked” problem. The authors have
done a very complete investigation of this area and made
excellent use of the Delphi Method. There is valuable
material in this paper to allow a given company to establish
an online continuous assessment process among profes-
sionals to expose and monitor the status of the risks and
reactions to them for its own supply chains. It is a clear
business continuity contribution.4.2. A survey of the literature on knowledge management as a
part of EMIS (Emergency Management Information Systems)
(Magiswary Dorasamy, Murali Raman and Maniam Kaliannan)
This study describes the nature of “applied” studies of the
use of Knowledge Management systems to prepare for or
respond to emergencies. By “applied,” the authors mean that
the paper is about an actual system, and not a theoretical
paper. Knowledge Management (KM) is defined as “the
practice of selectively applying knowledge from previous
experiences of decision making to current and future
decision making for the express purpose of improving the
organization's effectiveness.” It is clear that any EMIS has to
be based upon the design of a knowledge structure relevant
to this application area.
The authors located 51 published papers in refereed
journals and conference proceedings during the last 20 years,
which focused on disasters. It is noteworthy that a search of
standard databases for articles on the intersection of KM and
emergency management (EM) was not very fruitful. There
were over 8000 papers on KM, but only about 1% of them are
on KMS for disasters or emergencies. (This is actually their
first finding; that KM has not adequately been studied in
the domain of EM). More fruitful was searching journals
(e.g., IJISCRAM) and special issues of journals specifically on
EMIS, as well as conferences with tracks on this topic
(e.g., HICSS) or devoted to the topic (e.g. ISCRAM). One reason
that the direct searchwasmore fruitful is that only about half of
the qualifying papers located actually explicitly used the term
“KM” or “Knowledge Management.”
The most valuable part of this paper for most readers will
be Table 5 in their paper, which lists 51 papers and shows the
name of the system studied, a description of the system and
of its EM focus, and the method used to study the system
(most frequently, case study). The statistical analysis of the
set of papers identifies gaps in the literature; for instance,
there has been very little use of KMS–EMIS for pre-disaster
stages thus far, including training and preparedness (plan-
ning and forecasting). Based on analysis of the studies, the
authors conclude with design guidelines for KMS/EMIS
systems.
One specific and interesting result of this paper is the
concept of creating roles for emergencymanagement that are
embedded in the software and which can be taken on by any
user trained for that role. This is a recent concept in both
Knowledge Management and Software Engineering. The
paper summarizes the roles that have been defined in the
reviewed literature.
4.3. How the Internet of Things (IoT) technology enhances
emergency response operations (Lili Yang, Shuangua Yang, and
Linda Plotnick)
The “things” in the Internet of Things (IoT) are “any real or
virtual participating actors such as real world objects, human
beings, virtual data, and intelligent software agents. The
purpose of the IoT is to create an environment in which the
basic information from any one” can be shared with others in
real time.
The authors first describe the technological components
which enable real time sensor data, for instance the
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available to emergency managers or others. These include
RFID and wireless sensor network technologies, which
enable any device, such as a sensing device, to be located
or tracked and queried about whatever it is measuring, such
as temperature or smoke ingress or local gaseous compo-
sition; it is easy to see how such data would be useful to
first responders. Wireless communication technologies
span the gap between the “things” and the Internet, and
data fusion technologies allow the aggregation and inte-
gration of many different pieces of data from different
“things.”
After describing the technologies, the authors address
several research questions, such as how the IoT can enhance
Emergency Response. The domain chosen for this investiga-
tion is fire safety. An inductive approach was used to identify
patterns and generate hypotheses, based on interviews with
a total of 60 members of three fire and rescue services in the
UK. Results support the hypothesis that use of the IoT can
improve accountability of resources and personnel (e.g., give
an accurate count of resources and personnel on a scene);
assessment of the situation (e.g., support fast and accurate
situation awareness); assist in dynamic resource allocation
decisions; and support multi-organizational coordination
(e.g., track remaining resources of each organization). Thus,
the IoT can greatly enhance the carrying out and modification
of plans as a disaster unfolds. The application of the IoT to
emergency response in other domains and other nations
promises to be a rich area for future research and develop-
ment, as a part of any overall emergency planning and
forecasting effort.4.4. Improving emergency plans management with SAGA (Jose
H. Canos-Cerda, Marcos R Borges, Mª Carmen Penadés, Abel
Gómez, and Manuel Llavador)
This paper focuses on stressing the need for Information
Technology-enabled planning environments, either at the
national or organization-specific levels, which can lead to
more uniform plans, easier to evaluate and share, with support
to stakeholders. The paper includes a survey of how emergency
plans are managed in nine countries around the world. Based
on the study of these countries, the authors enumerate the
basic requirements for emergency planmanagement improve-
ment and propose SAGA, a framework that supports the full
lifecycle of emergency plan management. SAGA provides all
the actors involved in plan management a number of tools
to support all the stages of the plan lifecycle. SAGA is aimed
at covering the administrative aspects of emergency plan
management; it also provides support for emergency plan
designers via a reuse-enforcing development environment.
Access to information relevant to practitioners is provided by
the SAGA Digital Library, which consists of different reposito-
ries holding plans, plan fragments, and other resources. The
paper outlines the architecture of the system, and showswith a
case study how planning processes can benefit from a system
like SAGA. By means of the case study the authors illustrate
how despite the initial effort required to create content, once
content is available, the SAGA reusing mechanisms notably
ease the development of plans.The paper discusses the potential benefits of utilizing the
software they have developed to allow organizations to
share, compare, and improve existing plans for similar
organizations and facilities. It is clear that this process does
not exist today; however, it is very much wanted by those
responsible for developing emergency plans in existing
organizations. Too many plans are not good because they
are often contracted out to the cheapest source and not taken
seriously. Who can forget that the BP plan for an oil disaster
in the Gulf of Mexico called for saving the walruses? That was
a clear indicator that the plan supplied was never read
carefully.
4.5. A framework for agro-terrorism intentions detection using
overt data sources (Eli Rohn and Gil Erez)
This paper provides a framework for reducing agro-terrorism
related risks by means of early detection of exotic/foreign
pathogenic agents and their dispersion patterns. The paper
defines agro-terrorism as a hostile damaging action on an
agricultural gamut that includes infrastructure, inputs, processes,
and products, intentioned to substantially harm domestic or
international interests of the attacked, in order to advance political
objectives of the attacker. In spite of large investments in fighting
against terrorism threats, agro-terrorism has received very little
attention in this regard. In order to contribute to this research
effort the paper identifies weaknesses among the intelligence
community that must be addressed and integrates the classic
intelligence cycle for early detection that may lead to prevention
of such acts. It is made clear that such a threat can have a large
and significant impact and one might have a severe problem
distinguishing between unintentional and intentional occur-
rences of food contamination. The growing international trade in
an ever wider range of food and beverage products provides
significant opportunities for the occurrence of terrorist activities
in this area. It is not clear that measures of prevention and
detection are keeping up even with detecting unintentional
threats. The recent public discovery of the wide scale use of
horsemeat to augment beef products in the European Union has
caused considerable negative public reaction. The mislabeling of
fish cuts to artificially increase prices is another example of the
lack of mechanisms to detect and prevent even those abuses
based upon profit motives, let alone what might occur for
terrorism objectives.
The authors emphasize that early detection of data is the
best risk-management approach, when feasible, because it
would help to enable preventive measures. In this sense,
the development of agro-terrorism early warning policies
and supportive technologies requires harnessing current
knowhow and augmenting it to meet the potential forth-
coming challenges. To reach this aim the authors gather
different sources of knowledge into a framework. This
heterogeneity of references brings to this research a very
practice-oriented application and it is one of the main
added value points of the paper. One would hope that there
are significant national and international efforts to improve
and develop mechanisms of detection and prevention;
however, that is not publicly obvious. Another of the main
contributions of this research is its focus on the collection of
intelligent data. The very large number of threats derived
from the nature of agroterrorism indicates that the variety of
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potential target. The authors discuss some key issues for
carrying out intelligent data gathering based on information
technology (mostly Internet-based technology) in order to
support the early detection of agroterrorism acts.
5. Conclusions and observations
It is clear from this collection of papers that planning and
resulting activities like mitigation and improved investments
in infrastructure are not functioning the way they should be
in the general area of Emergency Preparedness and Manage-
ment. One hopes the area of terrorism is handled well as it
does appear to receive more attention and funding. Given the
large number of threats that are possible in the next decade
[11]; we need to see far more efforts at planning and
foresight for emergencies and exposure of the results of
these activities to the public. The hope is that the public will
encourage the leadership to undertake more of the efforts at
mitigation and preparedness that the planning and foresight
efforts indicate should be undertaken.
Some of the papers used two older “classic” references. We
consider these two papers as very fundamental with respect to
their potential emphasis on planning, foresight, and mitigation
in the disaster field. One by Dynes and Quarantelli [12]
reviewed thirty years of research into organizational behavior
in responding to disasters. It points out a large number of
considerations that today's organizations do not recognize
about the differences between effective and non-effective
responses to disasters. The second is the Turner framework
[4] for uncovering the reasons for poor planning. Both of these
papers deserve more rediscovery by the current generation of
professionals concerned with improving all the phases of
disaster investigations.
Turner's framework [4] offers an interesting challenge for
planning and, in particular, modeling. It indirectly indicates
that if we wish to understand the true nature of a specific
type of disaster on a particular type of location we should in
fact understand fully how three different phases of the
process interact over time.
1. The incubation period between occurrences of two similar
disasters,
2. The response period,
3. The extended recovery period.
If we want to undertake meaningful planning there
must be an understanding of all three periods and how
each one influences the next one in this cycle of disaster
states. The same set of states will repeat in later cycles of
disasters of a similar nature and magnitude. For example,
for the Cross Impact modeling approach, this presents a
rather interesting opportunity [13]. One could actually
build three separate models of this process. They could
easily be integrated into one overall model by the outcome
events overlapping greatly the source assumptions for the next
model in the cycle, and the final recovery process outcomes
being the source assumptions for the incubation period. In
other words, it would be relatively easy to expand the Cross
Impact approach to an integrated model across all the
necessary phases and create a three step dynamic model that
could become a comprehensive planning tool. This integrationof the three phases into what becomes a cyclic process allows
us to integrate the impact of risk formulation from the
incubation period all the way to the consequences of the
recovery phase.
This is a little more difficult to do in System Dynamics but
the most reliable System Dynamics models are the ones that
demonstrate cyclic or recurrent behavior [14]. There seems to
be a very common behavior across these three phases that are
in principle a complete cycle between occurrences of similar
disasters:
1. A major disaster of a specific type occurs.
2. A response occurs that is not considered a real success.
3. Much activity in the recovery focuses on how a disaster of
this type can be mitigated in the future and a number of
innovations and changes take place.
Time passes after the recovery and because of various
pressures, preparedness takes a back seat. In a few decades or
even less there is much pressure to use finances for other
purposes and more and more people that have not lived
through the last occurrence of this major disaster. The next
time the same type of disaster occurs in the same large
strength, the resulting response is once again poor, and we
continue the cycle.
So we can have interesting and significant models for
planning using System Dynamics as well. However, given that
well defined physical interactions are more easily modeled in
System Dynamics, and behavioral properties are more easily
modeled in Cross Impact, there may be situations where the
two methods can be integrated as part of the same modeling
effort. Whatever the approach to planning, the Turner frame-
work definitely shows us the serious consequences of ignoring
planning and mitigation in the incubation period, and the
potential for greatly increased damages and problems the
longer effective planning and mitigation are ignored. Models
that integrate the complete process are what are needed to
make the penalties of ignoring mitigation clear to both the
leadership and the public. It is also what is needed to carry out
very good foresight studies which must integrate the above
phases to claim relevancy for decision making that truly allows
the reduction of risks from effective planning. In spite of the
relevance of the national/supranational research agendas of
security and emergencymanagement there is a lack of foresight
studies in this area that cover fully the stages of Turner's model.
Nevertheless we recommend two valuable efforts in this
direction. At the supranational level there is the European
Security Research and Innovation Forum [15], supported by the
European Commission; at a national level, the efforts made by
the UK Foresight program such as Reducing Risks of Future
Disasters [16].
While this issue includes a very rich anduseful set ofmaterial,
we did feel that at least one area was significantly missing.
The growing involvement of citizens in the response phase of
disasters is a recent phenomenonparalleling the growth of social
media systems [17]. There has been some recent work on this
area [18] with respect to investigating and understanding it.
However, what is truly missing is to look at what could be done
to design for this trend and integrate it and citizen participation
into all the phases of disasters. There is in the literature on
this subject some very significant suggestions but very little
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investigation are:
1. Making organizational and local government disaster
plans open to the public for feedback and potential
support for actually financing effective mitigation. Re-
sponse plans for terrorist incidents might be an exception
to public access.
2. Designing systems that will allow the integration of
citizens and public organizations into all the phases in
the process.
3. Designing citizen participation systems that are not
limited to the design of social media systems which may
not be as useful for effective collaboration as ones
designed for disaster planning, response, and mitigation
formulation.
4. Public and private pre-commitment of resources and
talents for any aspect of disasters.
An example of a useful everyday system would be a
reporting system for any citizen emergency: trouble with a
utility service, public government service, accidents, hazards,
medical help, etc. This system would record the location,
provide maps, track services and backlog of services, and be
shared by all the agencies, organizations, and companies
involved. At any time, a citizen could see the distribution of
the types of events, how many are being serviced, and how
many are in a queue. When disasters occur it would then
become obvious where the major bottlenecks are developing,
occurring, or being handled. This would of course require
organized collaboration among many organizations that do
not really coordinate today.
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